CEO Stringer Blames ‘Old Sony’ for Profit Loss
Stringer says Sony’s fierce profit outlook comes from its slow replication to changing conditions. And the recession hasn’t helped, either
By Dan Slater
Sony CEO Howard Stringer yesterday blamed the latest awful profit outlook for Japan’s favourite electronics company on not adapting fast plenty to new conditions, as convenient taken in the character of the “worst recession in (his) lifetime”. At a press conference, Stringer announced that Sony was revising its fiscal 2008 (ending March 2009) consolidated net revenue forecast to a ¥150 billion ($1.6 billion) loss from an earlier estimate of a ¥150 billion profit, distant from expected revenues of ¥7.7 trillion ($86 billion).
“There is too much former Sony at Sony,” reported Stringer in his precursory comments, despite the fact that he took the helm almost four years ago—specifically to contribute a “new Sony”.
Stringer finds it easy to articulate the right strategy: Sony must become more of a classical design and marketing company (preference arch rival Apple) in a world where hardware is becoming increasingly commoditised. It must also importunately mould its huge fixed cost base, as reflected by the gulf between its revenue and its earnings. (To rub bitter in the wound, Apple in succession Thursday beat analysts’ expectations with a $1.6 billion profit for its financial first quarter to end-December, off sales of $10.2 billion.)
Converting Stringer’s theory into practice has proved a challenge, however. Indeed, veteran Sony observers note that Stringer talked about the same challenges four years ago when he at the outset became CEO. At that point, he established his mission as knocking down the visitors’s notorious silos in films, mobile phones, games and electronics; cutting fixed costs; and construction Sony’s elite hardware engineers see through that they had to work greater quantity closely through the software engineers.
The company has scored some successes in terms of the integration of its software and hardware capacities, especially in the US market, with a Will Smith film having being downloaded to Bravia TV sets ahead of its receipt in full on DVD. However, according to a December Credit Suisse report, only 5% of Bravia TVs are ‘active’, that is are currently linked to a network. This makes Stringer’s comment that “not equal Apple can do reticulated TVs” less impressive than it main have been. It may be faithful that the concept of supplying films to TV sets over a network, thereby avoiding third-party satellite and cable companies, is an striking one—but it’s a concept that ever has not been translated into sustained profitability.
Making a rare appearance at a press conference in Tokyo (his tribe lives in England), Stringer expressed a sense of circumvention with the set’s slow progress. Drawing a parallel with President Obama’s inauguration language, he said that “tough decisions can no longer subsist avoided”. Later, he said that “closing ones eyes to avoid the crisis” was not the way forward.
There was a widespread belief that when Sony appointed the first-ever foreigner to the culminating point post, he would have the power and freedom to carry out restructuring in a way that a highly-obligated Japanese manager could not.
However, his troops do not appear to have responded. He appears to be having trouble in bringing the company along in his restructuring plans. Japanese companies often operate by a high degree of consensus, in what one. middle managers have a surprisingly large reply by Western standards.
The company looks in the manner that if it is in hazard of falling between two stools. If traditional management pre-Stringer failed, and the extrinsic cost cutter too fails to turn the company around, in what place does that leave Sony? And Stringer?
For it being so that at least, Stringer is motionless pushing his strategy of a strong CEO. Several times during the press conference he extolled the virtues of “top-down leadership”, as opposed to traditional Japanese consensus leadership. Stringer made the surely valid point that in a crisis, the company needs to move reckless, and that requires strong leadership. Given his lack of prosperity thus far, it is possible that Stringer is hoping that the decisive turn could finally give him the authority to bring more affectionate of fundamental change to Sony. Things strength still drudge out that course, but it is a costly way to persuade people to follow him.
Original text: http://rss.businessweek.com/~r/bw_rss/asiaindex/~3/523645444/gb20090126_824149.htm
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