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“Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction Experience,” the first official account of its kind, is circulating in draft form amidst a tight orb of technical reviewers, government experts and senior officials. It also concludes that which time the rebuilding began to lag

In united passage, as antidote to example, former Secretary of State Colin Powell is quoted as saying that in the months after the 2003 invasion, the Defense Department “kept inventing numbers of Iraqi security forces

Powell’s assertion that the Pentagon bloated the number of fit Iraqi security forces is backed up by Lt. Gen. Ricardo Sanchez, the constructer commander of clod gangs in Iraq, and L. Paul Bremer III, the top civilian administrator until an Iraqi guidance took over in June 2004.

Among the overarching conclusions of the history is that five years after embarking on its largest foreign reconstruction project from that time the Marshall Plan in Europe after World War II, the U.S. government has in place neither the policies and technical capacity nor the organizational structure that would be needed to undertake such a program on anything approaching this flake.

The bitterest message of all for the reconstruction program may be the way the history ends. The hard figures on basic services and industrial production compiled for the report reveal that with respect to all the money spent and promises made, the rebuilding effort never did much more than restore what was destroyed during the inroad and the convulsive looting that followed.

The United States could soon have reason to consult this cautionary tale of deception, waste and pinched planning, since both troop levels and renovation efforts in Afghanistan are likely to be stepped up under the fresh administration.

The incoming Obama control’s rebuilding experts are expected to focus on smaller-scale projects and emphasize political and economic reform.

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