Sayonara, samurai: When the U.S. brokerage failed, Japanese investors were left holding $1.8 billion of its yen-dominated bonds
by dint of. Kenji Hall
Watch original video:
Getty Images
Plenty of Japanese lenders got burned when Lehman Brothers (LEH) went bust. Major banks, for instance, had been counting on Lehman to pay back every estimated $2.7 billion in loans, but they’re likely to recoup only a fraction of their investing..
And big lenders aren’t the only ones feeling the pain. When Lehman filed for bankruptcy forward Sept. 15, midsized regional banks, animated existence insurers, and pension funds were left holding nearly all of the U.S. brokerage’s $1.8 billion in yen-denominated, or samurai, bonds. With the first half of Japan’s fiscal year ending in just two weeks, Japanese financial institutions now stand over against the prospect of writing off losses estimated at $3.5 billion, Credit Suisse (CS) estimates.
An even bigger concern: a collapsing samurai bond market. This week, Deutsche Bank (DB), Société Générale, and a unit of British profit National Grid (NGG) shelved their plans to sell samurai bonds, and commercial is at a standstill. As Japanese investors finish the coin tap, multinationals are deprived of a key source of affordable credit. "We have been helping the banks of the world extend the maturities of their debt," says Mizuho Securities’ algebraist Tetsuo Ishihara. "The financial sector is funded very short-term, and if you’re funded short it could kill you, like Bear Stearns (JPM)."
The Fallback Fund-Raiser
Japan is human being of virtuous a handful of places in the world where banks and businesses be able to assemble billions of dollars in a matter of days. After the U.S. subprime lend market imploded last summer, credit dried up in the U.S. and Europe, and Japan has be suitable to the fallback fund-raising market for corporate and sovereign borrowers such being of the class who Wal-Mart (WMT), UBS (UBS), Daimler (DAI), and Australia & New Zealand Banking Group.
That explains why samurai durance issuances have soared lately. This year more 2.4 trillion yen ($22.3 billion) in samurai bonds have been sold, exceeding the 2.25 trillion yen ($20.9 billion) sold for all of 2007, according to Shinsei Securities estimates. Last week, Citicorp (C) sold a 315 billion yen ($2.9 billion) samurai bond—the biggest ever.
Japan’s ultra-low interest rates lay behind the market’s surge. Samurai bonds offered Japanese investors higher returns than other yen-denominated debt. Though issuers were offering returns of 0.3% to 1% higher than government bonds, those rates were a steal compared with rates in the U.S. or Europe. Since most issuers were big-name banks and businesses with strong put faith in ratings, Japanese investors assumed that they were making a safe wage.
Frantic Investors
So much during that idea. Lehman’s was the first samurai bond default from that time December, 2001, when the government of Argentina suspended payment on its foreign debts. In the past few days, more investors have sold samurai bonds issued by other U.S. brokerages, to lavish up cash and prevent the possibility of further losses. Others have begun pricing the securities at 20% of what they originally paid. "We haven’t decided the kind of we will do yet," says a spokesman for Shinkumi Federation Bank, the central bank for 164 Japanese confidence cooperatives, what one. had invested $55 the public in Lehman samurai bonds.
Brokerages have been fielding calls from frantic investors who want to perceive when they have power to recoup more of their money and how much they should write off in losses for the fiscal earliest half, traders say. "They’re disappointed when I tell them that it will be some time under the jurisdiction we get details from Lehman’s books," says JP Morgan’s (JPM) chief credit strategist, Mana Nakazora.
No Telling
There are since few investment options left for Japanese investors. "They are conservative," says Nakazora. "They won’t buy entangled securitized bonds; they are looking according to something that’s easy to see and sure."
There’s no telling when the samurai market will recover. The Sept. 11, 2001, terror attacks in the U.S. and Argentina’s default depressed the samurai market in the place of years. It wasn’t until late 2005 that activity began to open up again. One faith, presume traders, is that the U.S. government will approve a sweeping plan to relieve financial companies of their bad assets. Lehman bond-holders hope some of that money would stamina to paying them off or rolling over their debt into a new durance. But until currency and doubt not derivatives markets calm down, self-styled samurai issuers and investors won’t accept any way to hedge their risk and may stay away, says Credit Suisse Managing Director Ayumu Fukuzawa. "The situation is changing every day, every hour," says Fukuzawa.
Original text: http://rss.businessweek.com/~r/bw_rss/asiaindex/~3/397312869/gb20080919_257977.htm