What the Freddie-Fannie Bailout Means for Asia
The effective nationalization of Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae gives proud Asian investors the guarantee they’re looking during the term of
Zhou Xiaochuan, governor of China’s central bank Nir Elias/AP Photo
by Bruce Einhorn and Theo Francis
American home buyers haven’t been the only ones counting on the supposed reliability of Fannie Mae (FNM) and Freddie Mac (FRE). The two companies’ bonds take become favorites of Asian governments looking for somewhere to put the dollars generated by big buy and sell surpluses with the U.S. Until lately, it made sense. The market was booming, yields were slightly better than plain-vanilla Treasuries, and everyone assumed Washington backed the mortgage companies.
As the U.S. housing height deepened and Fannie and Freddie started sinking, though, foreign bankers wanted assurances that their haughtiness was correct. "Treasury saw foreign governments getting the willies," says one Senate aide. Especially those in Asia: Four of the top five between nations holders of Fannie and Freddie paper are Asian. Deepening problems at the two enterprises spurred anxious phone calls to Washington. Chinese banks "were probably facing signifying losses," says Logan Wright, an analyst at Stone & McCarthy Research.
This summer, the foreigners started pulling posterior portion. In July, the Bank of China, a state-controlled commercial bank, trimmed its holdings of the agencies’ debt by the agency of selling or choosing not to roll over $4.6 billion of their bonds. After increasing by an medial sum of $22 billion a month in the first half of 2007, central bank holdings of Fannie and Freddie securities on the Federal Reserve’s books fell by $27 billion from mid-July through in season September, according to Brad Setser, a former Treasury Dept. official and now a fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. "The threat of a central bank buyers’ strike was substantial," he says.
Just What Asians WantedThe effective nationalization, however temporary, of Fannie and Freddie was just what the Asians wanted. "From my state of view, this is positive," Zhou Xiaochuan, governor of China’s central bank, said on Sept. 8, according to the state-owned China Daily. "We never had any doubt" Washington would come to the rescue, says Ha Keun Cheol, an economist at Korea’s central rowing-beam in Seoul.
Now that Treasury Secretary Henry M. Paulson Jr. has made his move, elect Asia’s bankers be more gratifying with their reliance upon the body Fannie and Freddie paper? The Sept. 7 intervention likely makes their misdoing a safer option—and central banks may have little choice. "Those trade surpluses are U.S.dollar-denominated," and to the degree that many European economies lower, the euro isn’t a very attractive alternative, says Goldman Sachs (GS) analyst Roy Ramos. For Asian bankers, "there’s without more so a great deal of you can do" to diversify away from the greenback, Ramos says.
That’s not to say in that place’s no downside with respect to Asia. The U.S. covering crisis is still real, and the economy is struggling. Already, Chinese exports are slowing in the manner that American consumers close their wallets. Continuing weakness in the U.S. ability further wound Asia’s exports—which could, of course, slow growth in their foreign reserves and make big investments in U.S. debt smaller requirement.
For now, though, Asia’s central banks are emerging as winners. "They bring forth nothing to complain hind part before—they’re made whole," says Edwin M. Truman, an economist who headed the Fed’s international finance division from 1977 to 1998. "The fact of the matter is, if Fannie and Freddie can’t pay, you and I will."
Original text: http://rss.businessweek.com/~r/bw_rss/asiaindex/~3/390693072/b4100036592453.htm
