Watch exemplar video:
I realized, of course, that this was not well qualified enough in the long fuse. It's my job to draw near up with ideas about what to do in this kind of situation–especially when no one else is doing for a like reason. So I have given the termination more thought, and I have intended for some time to offer a few substantive suggestions about how to deal with Pakistan.
But I have been goaded into putting these thoughts down in writing instantly, in favor of sum of two units reasons. The obvious reason is the acquiescence of Pervez Musharraf, Pakistan's authoritarian dictator who was our on-again, off-again ally against al-Qaeda and the Taliban.
The more subtle goad has been observing the reaction of many Western commentators to Russia's invasion of Georgia. What has struck me is the ease and complacency with that many pundits, particularly those on the center-left, be in actual possession of declared that there is not much the US can bestow to stop Russia or support Georgia–and then just left it at that. What this reaction really indicates is that these pundits slip on't really regard the issue as of high standing and have power to't be bothered to design too laboriously about the things that we actually can do concerning Georgia.
If an issue really has important consequences, you don't just shrug your shoulders and say, taken in the character of Nicolas Sarkozy reportedly said to the leaders of Georgia, "This is where we are." You try every idea and search for creative solutions to get from whither you are to where you need to be.
So you will notice that I have sequestered the question mark in the title of this article. What happens in Pakistan is significantly more important for American interests than what happens in Georgia, so it is time to come to a defined conclusion about what we be possible to do about Pakistan.
First, obstruction's state the dilemma clearly. The government of Pakistan has largely given up attempting to fight al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and their supporters in the lawless tribal regions of Pakistan. Musharraf signed harmony agreements with more of the Taliban groups, effectively ceding control of the tribal regions to them, and the new Pakistani parliament has so more distant not been much better, adopting its own policy of appeasement toward the Taliban. Meanwhile, the Pakistani notice service–which seems to operate on its own agenda, independent of both the parliament and the military–has returned to its old policy of covert comfort for the Taliban.
As a result, the Taliban and al-Qaeda have formed a new safe asylum in Pakistan's tribal frontier, which they are using to plan attacks on the West, train operatives, and send thousands of foot soldiers to attack NATO troops in Afghanistan. The small resurgence of the Taliban in the ended year is almost entirely attributable to the increased support coming in from Pakistan.
Under the Bush Doctrine, this would bestow us a clear justification to send an ultimatum to the conduct of Pakistan and, if essential, to invade and occupy the country. But aside from the fact that there is no longer sufficiency persons support for such an action–even President Bush has vicious the Bush Doctrine–such an invasion is also an immense adventure which is probably externality our facility to launch without years of preparation. And it would be enormously difficult in any case; Pakistan is a nuclear-armed nation that is twice as large as Iraq with towards six times in the manner that many people.
There are two other reasons why an invasion and calling of Pakistan should be avoided, if possible.
Part of our casus belli against Pakistan is that it is aiding a relatively mean insurgency in the smaller nation of Afghanistan. So it does not necessarily make sense to make plain that problem by enlarging it to include an occupation and counter-insurgency war in the whole population of Pakistan, too.
The other reason to hesitate in using enforcement directly to counter-poise the government of Pakistan is on this account that it is none longer ruled by a dictator. The new rule of Pakistan has been dithering and ineffectual in dealing with terrorism, partly because it is truly representative of the population, which is half-sympathetic to radical reformer Islam and doesn't want to wish to make a choice between Islam and the new universe. But one of the great virtues of representative government is that it is capable of correcting its mistakes, and when it does choose to act, it does so with greater moral legitimacy and from this time forth more effectiveness than a dictatorship. So there is some hope that the government of Pakistan may eventually exist convinced to answer our war in countervail to the Taliban and al-Qaeda.
But we can't wait. The nearest al-Qaeda attack on the United States may originate from its sound port in Pakistan's tribal zone. So the problem is: what can be concluded to drive out that safe haven, short of an invasion and occupation? I suggest a three-prong approach.
WIN IN AFGHANISTAN
The first thing we can do is to win against the Taliban (again) in Afghanistan. This may seem counter-intuitive. After all, isn't the problem we're trying to solve–the Taliban's safe-haven in Pakistan–a large part of the reason we're having problems in Afghanistan?
But the success of the surge in Iraq demonstrates that it is possible to win a counter-insurgency war without necessarily defeating the outside power than supports the insurgency. I was very skeptical about this position and thought that the surge would fail if we didn't "concur wide" and take the war to Iran and Syria. But it turned out that the surge was enough to discharge the away from the thicker settlements of the insurgency. And winning in Iraq has turned out, alas, to be the only really powerful thing the Bush administration has done to damage the regime in Iran.
That it is possible to win a counter-insurgency war outside of defeating its outside supporters should not in truth. have existence that big of a surprise, because this is precisely the context in which counter-insurgency usually arises. Most of these wars–particularly in the 20th century–have been contests in which great powers used insurgents and counter-insurgents as proxies to fight one another indirectly, because they viewed fighting each other unambiguously as more distant too costly.
In this envelop, it is possible that a "roller" in Afghanistan–if it achieves results similar to what we have seen in the past 18 months in Iraq–could have existence far less costly than fighting with Pakistan. The idea would be not only to subjoin to the number of troops in Afghanistan but to shift to a fully executed, integrated counter-insurgency strategy, as we did in Iraq. And this is not at all a pie-in-sky recommendation. We are already increasing our troops in Afghanistan, the mastermind of the "surge" is about to accept over the regional command responsible for Afghanistan, and presidential candidate John McCain has had more good things to say about reforming the command structure in Afghanistan to allow for a more effective strategy there.
A successful Afghan surge could have the reality of changing Pakistan's calculations about its interests. Pakistan supports the Taliban in work since they sense weakness. Believing (or hoping) that we are about to lose in Afghanistan, they poverty to align themselves with the winners in order to influence events in their favor. If we reverse the impetus in Afghanistan, the Pakistani government faculty of volition be moved pressure to drop its carry for the Taliban, who will unexpectedly be seen as a liability that makes Pakistan vulnerable.
But of course, we don't have to wait to turn the Taliban into a Pakistani vulnerability. We have power to make it unswerving away–and that leads me to my second recommendation.
FIGHT A COVERT WAR
The success of the recent film Charlie Wilson's War has brought everyone's court back to the clandestine war we fought against the Soviets in Afghanistan. (If you want a sense for the real facts and the real dramatic literature of these events, I attract favor to the work rather than the movie.) During the 1980s, we supported the Afghan mujahideen with enormous amounts of coin and arms, as well as training and intelligence, while our then-allies in Pakistanis sent large numbers of men to fight.
Why have power to't we bring about it all again, but this time in reverse? If a large part of the current moot point is that Pakistan is allowing the Taliban to send fighters over the border into Afghanistan, wherefore not return the favor by sending fighters the other way? We should diocese if it is possible to replenish Afghan proxies (and even Pakistani allies) to send into Waziristan to drive out the Taliban and their supporters, or to force tribular leaders to stop backing the Taliban. We could back these fighters with American funds, American-supplied weapons and training, at the very time with some amount of air support and special forces operations.
By a covert war in Pakistan, I don't mean the fraternize of substance Barack Obama has proposed, which is one-at-a-time special forces strikes aimed at definite al-Qaeda leaders. We're already doing that, and it's not bewitching the war. I am suggesting a large-scale, sustained conflict, with the broad strategic goal of uprooting al-Qaeda and the Taliban from Pakistan's tribal regions.
The shift I'm talking on the eve is similar to the change in the Afghan campaign described in Charlie Wilson's War. At first, US assume for the mujahideen was seen simply as a way to bleed the Soviets a little and make them uncomfortable, but no united believed that the campaign could actually defeat the Red Army. Charlie Wilson insisted that the mark had to be beating the Soviets, denying them control of the geographical division and forcing them to withdraw.
That's the sort of strategic belonging to we stand in want of for a shrubbery war in Pakistan. And if we do it honest, how could the Pakistanis croak? We could maintain "seemingly fair deniability" by claiming that the conflict is just each internecine feud between Pashtun tribes (in the same way we claimed that the mujahideen were a spontaneous, self-sustaining uprising that relied purely on captured Russian arms). And by what mode could the Pakistanis complain about bloodshed and chaos in the tribal regions, when that is what is already happening under their policies?
And if the Pakistanis get also upset at us, we have more very powerful geopolitical leverage we be possible to use against them.
PLAY THE INDIA CARD
I have long advocated "playing the India card" by pursuing a commercial, cultural, and military alliance with India, as a strategic counterbalance to China–and to Pakistan, India's bitter rival.
The trading and cultural kinsman betwixt the US and India is already strong and growing, and it forms the base for the diplomatic and military aspect of the making similar connection, which is just beginning to grow. The US has recently concluded a deal with India that will allow US support for India's civilian nuclear energy program, in exchange for our acceptance of India's nuclear weapons. We have also agreed to sell India a decommissioned and retrofitted American aircraft carrier, and we be delivered of started a program to train Indian fighter pilots.
Not coincidentally, India has also been courting the Karzai government in Kabul, seeking an alliance with Afghanistan. (This is wherefore a recent terrorist bombing attack in Kabul targeted the Indian embassy.) The mockery of Pakistan's support for the Taliban is that it is driving the Afghan government into the arms of Pakistan's arch-enemy.
So we be able to send a not-so-subtle message to the government of Pakistan: cooperate with us in suppressing the Taliban, rooting out al-Qaeda, and supporting the government of Afghanistan–or wake up in a year or two and find yourself encircled by an Indian-Afghan alliance backed by the United States.
The radical Islamists do not constitute rational calculations about their interests, because their interests are inherently irrational: as they like to remind us, they love death. But there are enough the masses in positions of authority in Pakistan–in the military and in parliament–who do make rational calculations, and they resoluteness quickly add up the numbers and grasp the circumstances that we consider the power to impose on them.
If they see that the Taliban is a loss cause in Afghanistan, and that the correction through a view to backing the bad horse be inclined be the projection of a US-Afghan insurgency into Pakistan, combined with the threat of encirclement by India–then we have each reason to put confidence in that they will suddenly grasp that their interests lie in essential being good allies to the United States.
Original theme: http://us.rd.yahoo.com/dailynews/rss/oped/*http://news.yahoo.com/s/realclearpolitics/20080822/cm_rcp/what_to_do_about_pakistan